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4 
Introduction 
 
Historically there has been a notable disjuncture between economic policy and climate science, 
and formulation of industrial policy has been no exception. The presumption of inexhaustible 
natural resources and the absorption capacities of ecosystems made by economists was, in a 
sense, more explicable in the context of the benign ecological conditions of the 18th and 19th 
centuries. However, the growth of economic activity in the 20th century revealed the folly of 
such assumptions. It is a remarkable characteristic of our age that economic policy-making has 
still not yet come to terms with the relationship between the global economy and the ecological 
crisis, the role of government policy in organising ecological degradation, or the consequences 
of ecological degradation for the global economy in the 21st century. Industrial policy has 
remained committed to nurturing forms of economic activity that exacerbate ecological 
instability. 
Since the autumn of 2018, however, the Green New Deal has dramatically re-emerged on the 
political agenda across North America and Europe. These proposals invoke the Keynesian 
intellectual traditions of progressive parties but update and advance them through integrating 
ecological goals and drawing upon many strands of contemporary thinking and academic 
research on green industrial strategy, green quantitative easing, modern monetary theory, and 
the entrepreneurial state (Bailey and Craig 2018). The Democratic Representative, Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez, and the Sunrise Movement are widely credited with galvanising support for the 
policy programme – of which a green industrial strategy is a key component – particularly 
amongst younger generations. The boldness of the proposals and the charisma of Ocasio-Cortez 
appealed to large swathes of American progressives from urban cities to the deindustrialised 
surrounding areas. Her speeches on the topic – which tend to combine apocalyptic prophesising, 
utopian imagery and prosaic policy solutions – has re-shaped America’s political discourse. 
The scale of her ambitions were quickly matched by progressive parties in Europe that seized 
on the opportunity to advocate similar policy programmes. It has quickly become the most 
popular packaging of industrial policy of the current political moment.  
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The Global Economy’s Role in the Climate Emergency 
The onset of climate change, glacial retreat, rising sea levels, natural resource depletion, air 
and water pollution, deforestation, increasing waste, soil degradation, desertification, and 
biodiversity loss are beyond scientific dispute (AAAS 2014, UNDP 1996, Rockström et al. 
2009, IPCC 2018). According to the Global Footprint Network, humanity is currently using 
nature 1.7 times faster than our planet’s ecosystems can regenerate, and if every country on the 
planet consumed planetary resources at the rate of the UK then we would require 2.85 planet 
earths (Global Footprint Network 2019). If the global ecological footprint of human activity is 
not redressed it is projected that the ecosystem will decreasingly be able to sustain human 
civilisation. There will be increasing risks of wildfires, flooding, weather volatility (including 
severe storms and heatwaves), soil degradation and plummeting agricultural production, 
disruptions to a plethora of global supply chains, and forced displacement of populations. 
Major towns and cities may be permanently submerged and large geographical areas rendered 
uninhabitable (IPCC 2018).   
Climate change is amongst the most pressing of these environmental issues. The IPCC believe 
that to avoid catastrophic climate change we must reduce global greenhouse gas emissions 45% 
by 2030 and 100% by 2050. This demands, in the words of the IPCC, "rapid, far-reaching and 
unprecedented changes", including to systems of production and consumption in the global 
economy (IPCC 2018). The recognition of climate emergency and the 2015 Paris Accord 
indicate a degree of political commitment to decarbonisation, but the specific political and 
economic elements of these commitments remain ambiguous.  
The operations of the global economy are deeply complicit in placing intolerable pressure on 
planetary ecosystems. This includes entrenched and normalised systems of production and 
consumption that span the global economy, most notably those in the fossil fuel, transport, 
aviation, and agriculture industries (Newell 2013, Pollin 2015). These systems of production 
and consumption tend to generate high levels of greenhouse gas emissions and/or require the 
continual extraction of natural resources. The causal link between industrialisation and the rise 
of greenhouse gases can be traced back as far the industrial revolution and, at a planetary level, 
that link remains strong today (Jarvis et al. 2012, Brand and Wissen 2012).  
It is for this reason that many political economists believe the current geological age should be 
understood not as the Anthropocene but instead as the ‘Capitolocene’. The latter term captures 
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6 
the centrality of (otherwise naturalised) economic systems in driving processes of ecological 
destruction, as well as eschewing the politically-disabling Malthusian focus on ‘humans’ as the 
primary source of geological impact (Moore 2017). 
Simultaneously, climate change is likely to lead to numerous market failures. Macroeconomic 
modelling exercises demonstrate that climate change poses serious consequences for 
macroeconomic and financial stability. This includes disruption to the production practices and 
resource inputs of numerous supply chains, increasingly volatile agricultural production in 
regions affected by drought or other climate-related changes, the re-evaluation of asset prices, 
increased insurance claims and liabilities for insurance and reinsurance companies, and 
increasingly frequent banking crises (Christophers 2017; Lamperti et al. 2019). As such, the 
need to avert the instability wreaked by climate change should be seen not simply as a moral 
imperative but also an economic necessity. 
It has become a common political tendency for ecological issues to be portrayed as technical 
and apolitical problems to which businesses and consumers must respond rather than symptoms 
of global capitalism. Yet a transformation on the scale and at the speed required simply cannot 
be left to the businesses and consumers in unfettered markets. Karl Polanyi’s warning that 
“leaving the fate of soil and people to the market would be tantamount to annihilating them” 
(Polanyi 1944: 137) remains relevant today. The climate emergency requires the (belated) 
intervention of states around the world to transform the industries most associated with the 
degradation of the global commons.  
 
The Green New Deal 
The Green New Deal was originally devised in London in 2008 by the Green New Deal Group 
comprising Caroline Lucas, Richard Murphy, Ann Pettifor, Larry Elliot and Andrew Simms 
amongst others (Green New Deal Group 2008). It received support from numerous figures at 
the time including the United Nations (UNEP 2009). Unfortunately, the ‘public debt crisis’ 
narration of contemporaneous political events, that rationalised the turn to austerity, rendered 
any such Keynesian stimulus politically unviable. As public investment contracted during the 
period of austerity, the recession was prolonged and the growth models which had produced 
both the crash and ecological degradation were left largely unmodified.  
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At the heart of the Green New Deal idea is one of the most fundamental presuppositions in the 
study of political economy. Put simply, that the global economy is organised and continuously 
re-shaped by political authorities. This includes most obviously the policies of the state. Given 
the timelines imposed upon us by the climate science, it is surely uncontroversial to say that a 
programme of industrial decarbonisation of the rapidity and scale required can only be 
orchestrated by states. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a successful and equitable transition 
that doesn’t include the state’s powers to regulate, outlaw, marshal public investment, 
disincentivise and incentivise through tax policies, and implement industrial policy. The state 
– love it or hate it – is unrivalled as a body politic in orchestrating macroeconomic change.
States cannot act in isolation of course – they must work in collaboration with each other as 
well as local governments, local communities and labour unions to design the policies that 
accomplish just transitions. Nonetheless, the capacity and legitimacy of states render them 
primus inter pares in meeting the governance challenges of transforming economies and 
societies (Bailey and Craig 2018). 
The Green New Deal has become a prominent feature of North American and European 
political discourse. The charisma of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez helped raise the profile of the 
policy agenda and capture the imaginations of young progressive activists. Inspired by the 
success of Ocasio-Cortez and the Sunrise Movement, a collection of grassroots campaigners, 
trade unionists and politicians from the Green Party, Labour Party and Conservative Party 
sought to revive a British version of the idea after a decade of dormancy in the early months of 
2019 (Satow 2019, Miliband et al. 2019). The agenda has brought together young green-
minded activists, a selection of labour unions (such as the shipbuilders in Belfast demanding 
the docks be nationalised and utilised for renewable energy production), and those politicians 
seeking to address the economic failings of current growth strategies. 
The industrial policy component of the Green New Deal proposals are designed to usher in the 
kind of structural transformation of national economies required by the climate science. These 
proposals entail vertically supporting the growth of low-carbon economic sectors through 
subsidies and tax incentives, financing the expansion of renewable energy production, 
improving energy efficiency through retrograding residential and commercial buildings, 
enforcing stronger regulations and tax disincentives on fossil fuel companies and the industries 
fuelled by them, and rolling out low-carbon public infrastructure. The industrial interventions 
comprising the Green New Deal will differ between countries, but in the UK it could include 
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the electrification of cars produced by the automotive industry, upgrading production systems 
in manufacturing and chemical industries, financing the production of solar and wind power, 
and imposing stringent green regulations on the financial sector.  
As can be inferred through the Keynesian heritage of the term, the Green New Deal is not only 
a decarbonisation project but is also designed to create well-paid jobs and educational and 
training opportunities in technology development, manufacturing and construction (US 
Congress 2019). In this regard, the green industrial policies deployed by the German and 
Danish governments in recent years, which have fostered the growth of low-carbon energy 
companies, could serve as templates for UK policy-makers.   
Unlike Roosevelt’s New Deal, though, the modern day proponents of the agenda tend to insist 
that the programme represents a ‘new social contract’ (Gunn-Wright and Hockett 2018: 9). 
This entails a commitment to ensuring that public investment programmes reduce racial, gender 
and income inequalities, inaugurating a more progressive taxation regime, providing universal 
healthcare, introducing a ‘jobs guarantee’, and investing in sectors with limited multiplier 
effects such as the care economy and the public sector. These measures are not ‘add-ons’, 
Green New Deal proponent insist. Instead they should be seen as essential measures for 
reducing the exposure of the labour market to any economic turbulence created by the policies 
designed to bring about a transition to environmental sustainability and ensuring that a green 
transformation of the economy does not reproduce existing inequalities between workers 
(Moore et al. 2019, Klein 2019). 
A profoundly troubling critique of the policy is that the construction of renewable energy 
infrastructure itself has environmental consequences. The manufacture of this new 
infrastructure itself will not be free of emissions, and it has been pointed out that wind turbines, 
solar panels and electric batteries require the extraction of finite resources from around the 
world such as cobalt, lithium, silver and copper. As a result, Asad Rehman of War on Want 
believes that the Green New Deal is borne of a colonial mindset which posits that “the UK and 
other rich countries are entitled to a greater share of the world’s finite resources irrespective of 
who we impoverish in doing so, or the destruction we cause” (Rehman 2019). The dash for 
mineral extraction that is the corollary of any putative green new deal would, in Rehman’s 
mind, signify “a new form of green colonialism that will continue to sacrifice the people of the 
global south to maintain our broken economic model” (Rehman 2019). The specific issues 
surrounding mineral extraction are indeed deeply troubling. As this suggests, a truly just 
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transition requires more than the manufacture of new technology and infrastructure in a handful 
of countries. It must also include a commitment to counteracting the injustices of past and 
future extractivism through radical political action that tackles inequalities on a global scale 
(Taylor and Paul 2019, Varoufakis and Adler 2019). This serves to underline the need to 
combine industrial policy with another component of the Green New Deal – the policies which 
represent a new social contract capable of alleviating global inequalities and embedding the 
economy into society and planetary limits. 
The orchestration of a green industrial intervention by policymakers at the Treasury and the 
Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will not by itself be sufficient to 
accomplish the harmonisation of environmental sustainability and economic sustainability. 
This accomplishment may require numerous other forms of government intervention and 
economic transformation in addition to, or immediately following, the implementation of a 
Green New Deal. This may include stronger regulatory and tax disincentives imposed on the 
industries most closely associated with ecological degradation (not least to ensure the 
‘multiplier effect’ is channelled elsewhere), a complementary “post-industrial strategy” that 
supports economic sectors not likely to add to GDP but crucial to social wellbeing, and a 
renewal of the welfare system. It may also include more radical forms of economic 
transformation that challenge some sacred cows of capitalist economic management that go far 
beyond the ‘win-win’ policy scenarios being presented by Green New Deal activists. Just 
transitions to sustainability, if they are to occur, will thus be multifaceted and strongly shaped 
by the prevailing political and economic conditions of each country. An ambitious green 
industrial intervention should certainly not be thought of as a ‘silver bullet’ by either 
policymakers or activists, but it does promise to make significant inroads toward meeting 
national decarbonisation targets through confronting key engines of ecological degradation. 
The linking of industrial policy with environmental targets is thus a crucial component of the 
UK’s response to the climate emergency.  
The Politics of Greening Industrial Policy in the UK 
The language of industrial policy was re-introduced to British Politics by Theresa May in 2016, 
after a long hiatus in which it was widely seen as a relic of a bygone era. Its re-introduction 
was seen as a recognition that political action was required to tackle the various economic 
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weaknesses and dysfunctions laid bare by the global financial crisis, as well as the disaffection 
with the status quo underlying the vote to leave the European Union. As Berry and Barker 
outlined in a previous Future Economies Research and Policy Paper, these failings included 
the UK’s trade deficit in goods, low levels of investment in R&D, the paucity of financing 
options for SMEs, stark geographic inequalities, and training and skills shortages (Berry and 
Barker 2019). Theresa May’s purported desire as Prime Minister was to build “an economy 
that works for everyone” (May 2016).  
In November 2017, the much-anticipated industrial strategy white paper identified four ‘grand 
challenges’ towards which the government’s industrial policies should be geared – one of 
which was the need for “clean growth” (HM Government 2017). The recently established 
Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) seemed to possess the relevant 
policy portfolios needed to deliver on this mission.  
This turn towards ‘One Nation’ Conservative interventionism, however, proved to be short-
lived. Progress on ‘cleaning’ Britain’s growth model was soon hindered by the Treasury and 
the political maelstrom created by Brexit. As Theresa May struggled to command the support 
of her party in the midst of the Brexit negotiations, reforms to existing government policy 
proved more limited than initially anticipated. The continued emphasis on the conventional 
priorities and instruments of industrial policy – capital spending on infrastructure and support 
for R&D – reflected the antipathy towards state-led macroeconomic change held by many 
senior figures in the Conservative Party. 
Under the leadership of Boris Johnson, the 2019 Conservative Party manifesto seeks to trumpet 
the environmental achievements made so far – based typically on misleading statistics rooted 
in methodological nationalism – and re-state the belief that “free markets, innovation and 
prosperity can protect the planet” (Conservative Party 2019). The manifesto does recognise the 
need to reach net zero emissions by 2050 and promises to offer invest in the energy efficiency 
of public sector buildings, homes and certain systems of energy production. It also pledges to 
provide budgets to deal with specific environmental issues such as flood defences 
(Conservative Party 2019). In this sense, the manifesto does represent a degree of evolution in 
Conservative Party policy. Yet the ideological commitment to market-based solutions rather 
than interventionist political action means that the manifesto refrains from offering an 
industrial strategy that remedies the root economic drivers of the crisis. It thus fails to live up 
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to the Conservative Party’s proclaimed ‘ambition’ on tackling the climate emergency. Indeed, 
its professed ambition is belied by the decision to set long-term targets with minimal short-
term commitments, as well as the self-congratulatory posturing that has characterised the 
party’s campaigning. 
The 2019 Labour Party Manifesto, meanwhile, places far greater importance on industrial 
policy as a tool for instigating economic and environmental change. Additional public 
investment will be manifest in a ‘Green Transformation Fund’ worth £250 billion as well as a 
National Investment Bank tasked with allocating a further £250 billion of credit over 10 years 
for the purpose of funding the types of production, infrastructure, enterprise and innovation 
compatible with decarbonisation goals (Labour Party 2019). They also pledge to strengthen the 
powers of financial regulators in order to “mobilise green investment” and “manage the risk to 
financial stability posed by short-sighted investment in polluting assets” (Labour Party 2019). 
Through mobilising both public investment and attempting to ‘crowd in’ private investment, 
Labour seek to transform a range of industries, transport systems, energy sources and buildings 
in ways that achieve “the majority” of the UK’s emission reduction by 2030 (Labour Party 
2019). It is projected that one million ‘green jobs’ would be created via investment in 
retrofitting buildings and in the nascent renewable energy sector (including in offshore and 
onshore wind, tidal and solar energy production). The agenda has become a key pillar of 
Labour’s economic pitch to the electorate. 
The Labour leadership eschew the ‘Green New Deal’ as a term in favour of ‘green industrial 
revolution’ on the basis that the former is not part of Britain’s ‘national political memory’ 
(McDonnell 2019), but nonetheless the activities of Green New Deal campaigners are regularly 
acclaimed (McDonnell 2019, NEF 2019). Moreover, a Green New Deal bill was put forward 
in the House of Commons in March 2019 by the Labour Party’s Clive Lewis MP alongside 
Caroline Lucas of the Green Party, which in comparison to American iterations contained a 
markedly stronger emphasis on regional inequalities, reversing austerity measures, and the 
expansion of public ownership and democratic control of industry (Lucas 2019, Satow 2019). 
Building on the prior calls for a ‘green jobs revolution’ in 2018 (BBC 2018), the promise of a 
‘green industrial revolution’ embodied a very similar agenda to the Green New Deal. The term 
was used throughout 2019 by the Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell, the Shadow Secretary 
of the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Rebecca Long-Bailey, and the 
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Labour Party’s first minister of Climate Justice and Green Jobs, Danielle Rowley, amongst 
others. The agenda then became a key component of Labour’s electoral campaigning. 
For the Labour Party this agenda represents not only a commensurate and electorally expedient 
response to the climate emergency; it also reflects an opportunity to transform the unstable and 
unbalanced UK economic strategy (sometimes referred to as the Anglo-Liberal Growth model) 
and invest in British jobs after years of austerity. Addressing regional inequalities through the 
creation of green jobs has long been a theme of Labour rhetoric but it has become increasingly 
prevalent. Rebecca Long-Bailey has hailed the green industrial revolution as an “opportunity 
to rebuild Britain and many of those communities that had been “left behind” and address both 
inequality and climate change (NEF 2019). She stated that a future Labour government should 
“transform the UK through a green jobs revolution, tackling the environmental crisis in a way 
that brings hope and prosperity back to parts of the UK that have been held back for too long” 
(Long-Bailey 2019). This represents not only an inclination towards decarbonisation but also 
an economic transformation which (they hope) will appeal to working class voters feeling 
alienated due to decades of deindustrialisation, public service cuts, and the failure of 
democratic institutions to realise Brexit. 
In order to navigate the numerous political obstacles pertaining to the institutional terrain of 
the British State, Labour plan a dual transformation of UK fiscal and monetary policy-making. 
The Treasury’s investment rules will purported be redesigned and a newly-created ‘Sustainable 
Investment Board’ would bring together the Chancellor, the Business Secretary and Bank of 
England Governor to “oversee, co-ordinate and bring forward investment” (Labour Party 2019). 
These institutional transformations are crucial to ensuring investment capital is successfully 
mobilised in service of a green industrial strategy. 
The electorate’s shifting priorities has also prompted the Liberal Democrats to profess an 
interest in green industrial policies. The current leader, Jo Swinson, pledged a series of 
measures including re-inaugurating a Green Investment Bank with powers to borrow money 
from the private sector designed to vertically target the nascent low-carbon economy, as well 
as bringing back a department of climate change. These institutions would help make progress 
on renewable energy production, building insulation and the transition to electric vehicles by 
2030 (Liberal Democrats 2019). In addition, Swinson has reversed her support for the fracking 
industry in the face of a public backlash. These commitments are far weaker than the pledges 
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made by the Labour Party and Green Party, but they could potentially be significant if the 
Liberal Democrats were called upon to form a coalition in the event of a hung parliament.  
The Green Party’s ambitions dwarf the promises made by all other UK parties. They have 
pledged to implement an industrial strategy that transforms the country’s economy, 
infrastructure, transport, agriculture and housing stock, in order to reach net zero emissions by 
2030 (Green Party 2019). They plan to borrow £1 trillion over ten years to achieve this mission; 
four times the amount pledged by Labour (Green Party 2019). Furthermore, they profess a 
greater commitment to ensuring that a Green New Deal remedies past injustices and global 
inequalities than any other party. They explicitly recognise that “as one of the world’s richest 
countries and being amongst the first to industrialise, the UK has caused more historical climate 
change emissions than most. We have a moral imperative to right the wrongs of the past, 
including using our influence and wealth to help alleviate suffering and redress global power 
imbalances” (Green Party 2019: 45). They propose ensuring “just supply chains” for the 
“materials necessary for the Green New Deal”, making finance and technology available to 
support developing nations formulate local Green New Deals, and prioritising the need to 
tackle the climate emergency and poverty in the UK’s international aid budget (Green Party 
2019: 45-46). The Green Party are represented by one MP in the House of Commons, however, 
and are not widely expected to significantly increase their representation in the near future. 
The sudden desire for political parties to display their green credentials to the electorate, and 
the palpable enthusiasm for the Green New Deal in the UK more broadly, means that green 
industrial policies are within the parameters of the Overton window more so than ever before. 
Yet given the ‘First Past the Post’ electoral system it is uncontroversial to contend that 
operationalising a green industrial strategy in the UK is contingent on a General Election 
outcome that places the Labour Party in government. Subsequently, operationalising a green 
industrial strategy successfully also depends on the skilful navigation (and perhaps 
transformation) of the institutional setting bequeathed to that hypothetical government. These 
are not insignificant impediments.  
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Financing a green industrial transformation 
The financing of this programme of public investment could be derived from numerous sources 
of governmental revenue, using both fiscal and monetary policy tools, all of which represent 
partial but viable options for policy-makers. 
Most obviously, governments could countenance raising additional taxation to fund a green 
industrial strategy. The politics of taxation renders this treacherous terrain in Westminster, but 
raising corporation tax would perhaps represent the path of least resistance and help remedy 
the market’s collective action problem of low investment. Such a move would be met with 
fierce opposition but would represent a conventional approach. Numerous other avenues of 
raising government revenue through taxation are also apparent, not least carbon taxes and 
wealth taxes. Introducing or raising carbon taxes on certain forms of consumer spending (e.g. 
booking multiple flights per year) would help generate additional tax income as well as 
disincentivise certain forms of consumption. It is vital to ensure, however, that any additional 
taxes levied are not regressive in their effects, in order to ensure a just transition and avoid 
summoning gilets jaune protests in the UK.  
Equally, governments could simply re-direct a host of subsidies that are currently awarded to 
industries associated with ecological degradation to the putative green economy. According to 
the UK’s Environmental Audit Committee, energy subsidies are currently “around £12bn a 
year; much directed at fossil fuels” (Environmental Audit Committee 2013). The re-allocating 
of government capital to low-carbon and jobs-rich sectors of the renewable energy industry 
would help nurture their growth as well as send strong signals to the capital markets about the 
new developmental strategy, thereby encouraging a ‘crowding in’ of private finance. 
The relatively inexpensive cost of borrowing afforded to current governments enables further 
‘fiscal space’. Investment capital remains attracted to the safe haven of government bond yields 
in the midst of current economic uncertainty, meaning that (at the time of writing) the UK 
government is able to borrow money from the capital markets over a ten-year period for less 
than 1% interest. Indeed, it is cheaper to finance a stimulus for Sajid Javid today than it was 
for George Osborne throughout his entire tenure in Whitehall (Trading Economics 2019). An 
entrepreneurial state could seize this opportunity to channel risk-averse capital into productive 
outlets. As founding Green New Deal proponent, Ann Pettifor, has recently argued, the creation 
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of well-paid jobs and profitable industries through this particular investment will generate 
higher tax revenues which can help pay back this borrowing in the long-term (Pettifor 2019).  
Any optimism of generating revenue through taxation and borrowing should be tempered, 
however, by recognising the inevitable confrontation of Green New Deal proposals with the 
‘Treasury View’. The Treasury’s command of the government’s purse strings and its de facto 
role in arbitrating domestic policy has endowed it with a degree of control which far exceeds 
its notional remit (Meadway 2019). As Alfie Stirling noted at a recent Future Economies event, 
the Treasury’s fiscal rules represent a formidable political barrier to implementing a fiscal 
stimulus on the scale required by the climate emergency. The tendency to promote ‘growth 
model repair’ rather than transformation, in the words of Martin Craig, renders Whitehall the 
most significant obstacle to implementing a truly transformative economic agenda in the UK 
(Craig, 2018). 
Partly for this reason, circumventing the Treasury by capitalising on monetary stimulus, rather 
than fiscal stimulus, is appealing to many Green New Deal advocates. Quantitative Easing – 
which combines the ex nihilo creation of bank reserves by central banks with asset purchases 
in the core economy – represents a further stream of public investment that could be harnessed 
for progressive purposes. This form of stimulus became a new tool of crisis management for 
central banks across the globe after the 2008 financial crash, with the European Central Bank 
introducing yet another round of bond purchases at the time of writing (September 2019). 
Although the character of the asset purchases comprising successive rounds of quantitative 
easing have undoubtedly had regressive distributional effects and exacerbated climate change 
(Bank of England 2012, Ryan-Collins 2013, Green and Lavery 2015, Matikainen et al. 2017, 
Bailey and Craig 2018), there have been numerous calls to infuse the programme with greater 
social and ecological purpose (Ryan-Collins 2013, Corbyn 2015, Murphy 2018, Coppola 2019). 
A recalibration of the criteria for asset purchases inside Central Banks could inaugurate a round 
of ‘green quantitative easing’, designed to promote a transformational development strategy 
(Ryan-Collins 2013, Bailey and Craig 2018). In this scenario, a Central Bank would purchase 
the assets of a ‘green investment fund’ managed by another state agency, which would then be 
utilised to make a series of strategic investments in low-carbon sectors. Given the 
macroprudential remits imposed on Central Banks and the evident systemic risks presented by 
climate change, the Governor of the Bank of England has already admitted that greening 
quantitative easing is a possibility (The Financial Times 2018). The prospects of recalibrating 
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the QE programme will be heavily conditioned by the appointment of Carney’s successor in 
2020. 
The exact composition of the financial plan underpinning a green stimulus will be dependent 
on the prevailing political and economic conditions of the time, but the historically forgiving 
fiscal space and innovative monetary instruments available to policy-makers at the present 
moment presents a remarkable opportunity. With private capital tending to be risk averse and 
attracted to unsustainable economic sectors (Di Muzio 2011), fiscal and monetary policy tools 
are crucial predicates to operationalising any green economic transformation.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Time is running out on our ability to mitigate the most catastrophic consequences of the climate 
crisis. The timeframe given by the IPCC demand that British economic statecraft in the 2020s 
– of which industrial policy is a key component – become cognisant of the environmental 
targets agreed by the 2015 Paris Accord. This requires the historical silos between the 
government’s economic and environmental objectives to be speedily dismantled. 
 
The Green New Deal may not amount to a silver bullet for ecological crisis resolution on its 
own, but it does constitute a vital set of measures for confronting the dynamics in the global 
economy that intensify greenhouse gas emissions and ecological degradation more broadly 
conceived. The proposals put forward by proponents offer a prescriptive outline of the types of 
industrial transformation demanded by the climate science, the industrial policy tools required 
to orchestrate such change, and the public policy measures needed to ensure that the transition 
is socially just. As well as representing a programme for decarbonisation, it also offers a 
remedy for Britain’s longstanding issues surrounding productivity and regional inequality. 
 
The barriers to implementing the Green New Deal in the UK will undoubtedly be formidable. 
The re-introduction of the language of industrial strategy by May proved to be a false dawn as 
the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has sought to shore up – rather 
than transform – the existing UK growth model. The modus operandi of both the Treasury and 
Bank of England are likely to present even fiercer opposition to proposals of green industrial 
transformation. The erosion and privatisation of the UK’s Green Investment Bank in the last 
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ten years demonstrates the hostility within the corridors of power in Whitehall towards even 
incremental forms of green industrial policy. It is, therefore, likely that we will need to 
accomplish a green transformation of the British state before a green transformation of the 
British economy can be orchestrated.  
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